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Abstract
Change detection is a classic paradigm that has been used for decades to argue that working memory can hold no more
than a fixed number of items (‘‘item-limit models’’). Recent findings force us to consider the alternative view that working
memory is limited by the precision in stimulus encoding, with mean precision decreasing with increasing set size
(‘‘continuous-resource models’’). Most previous studies that used the change detection paradigm have ignored effects of
limited encoding precision by using highly discriminable stimuli and only large changes. We conducted two change
detection experiments (orientation and color) in which change magnitudes were drawn from a wide range, including small
changes. In a rigorous comparison of five models, we found no evidence of an item limit. Instead, human change detection
performance was best explained by a continuous-resource model in which encoding precision is variable across items and
trials even at a given set size. This model accounts for comparison errors in a principled, probabilistic manner. Our findings
sharply challenge the theoretical basis for most neural studies of working memory capacity.
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Introduction
Visual working memory, the ability to buffer visual information
over time intervals of the order of seconds, is a fundamental aspect
of cognition. It is essential for detecting changes [1–3], integrating
information across eye fixations [4–5], and planning goal-directed
reaching movements [6]. Numerous studies have found that visual
working memory is limited, but the precise nature of its limitations
is subject of intense debate [7–14]. The standard view is that visual
working memory cannot hold more than about four items, with
any excess items being discarded [7–9,15–18]. According to an
alternative hypothesis, working memory limitations take the form
of a gradual decrease in the encoding precision of stimuli with
increasing set size [10–11,13,19–23]. In this view, encoding
precision is a continuous quantity, and this hypothesis has
therefore also been referred to as the continuous-resource
hypothesis.
Historically, the leading paradigm for studying visual working
memory has been change detection, a task in which observers
report whether a change occurred between two scenes separated
in time [2–3,24]. Not only humans, but also non-human primates
can perform multiple-item change detection [25–28], and
physiological studies have begun to investigate the neural
mechanisms involved in this task [27]. Findings from change
detection studies have been used widely to argue in favor of the
item-limit hypothesis [2,8,15–18]. The majority of these studies,
however, used stimuli that differed categorically from each other,
such as line drawings of everyday objects or highly distinct and
easily named colors. The logic is that for such stimuli, changes are
large relative to the noise, avoiding the problem of ‘‘comparison
errors’’ [1,18,29–30] that would be associated with low encoding
precision (high noise). When encoding precision is limited, an
observer’s stimulus measurements are noisy and will differ between
displays for each item, even if the item did not change. The
observer then has to decide whether a difference in measurements
is due to noise only or to a change plus noise, which is especially
problematic when changes are small. This signal detection
problem results in comparison errors.
Attempts to avoid such errors by using categorical stimuli run
into two objections: first, using such stimuli does not guarantee
that comparison errors are absent and can be ignored in
modeling; second, there is no good reason to avoid comparison
errors, since the pattern of such errors can help to distinguish
models. Ideally, change detection performance should be
measured across a wide range of change magnitudes, including
small values, as we do here. Comparison errors can, in fact, be
modeled rather easily within the context of a Bayesian-observer
model. Bayesian inference is the decision strategy that maximizes
an observer’s accuracy given noisy measurements [31–32], and
was recently found to describe human decision-making in change
detection well [33].
We conducted two change detection experiments, in the
orientation and color domains, in which we varied both set size
and the magnitude of change. We rigorously tested five models of
working memory limitations, each consisting of an encoding stage
and a decision stage. The encoding stage differed between the five
models: the original item-limit model [2,15–16], two recent
variants [9], and two continuous-resource models, one with equal
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precision for all items [20,23], and one with item-to-item and trial-
to-trial variability in precision [13,33]. The decision stage was
Bayesian for every model. To anticipate our results, we find that
variable precision coupled with Bayesian inference provides a
highly accurate account of human working memory performance
across change magnitudes, set sizes, and feature dimensions, and
far outperforms models that postulate an item limit.
Results
Theory
We model a task in which the observer is presented with two
displays, each containing N oriented stimuli and separated in time
by a delay period. On each trial, there is a 50% probability that
one stimulus changes orientation between the first and the second
display. The change can be of any magnitude. Observers report
whether or not a change occurred. We tested five models of this
task, which differ in the way they conceptualize what memory
resource consists of and how it is distributed across items (Fig. 1a).
Infinite-precision item-limit model. In the infinite-preci-
sion (IP) item-limit model, the oldest item-limit model [2,8,15–16]
and often called the ‘‘limited-capacity’’ or simply the ‘‘item-limit’’
model, memorized items are stored in one of K available ‘‘slots’’. K
is called the capacity. Each slot can hold exactly one item. The
memory of a stored item is perfect (‘‘infinite precision’’). If N#K,
all items from the first display are stored. If N.K, the observer
memorizes K randomly chosen items from the first display. When
a change occurs among the memorized items, the observer
responds ‘‘change’’ with probability 12e. When no change occurs
among the memorized items, the observer responds ‘‘change’’ with
a guessing probability g.
Precision and noise. All models other than the IP model
assume that the observer’s measurement of each stimulus is
corrupted by noise. We model the measurement x of a stimulus h
as being drawn from a Von Mises (circular normal) distribution
centered at h:
p xDhð Þ~ 1
2pI0 kð Þ e
k cos x{hð Þ, ð1Þ
where k is called the concentration parameter and I0 is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind of order 0. (For convenience, we
remap all orientations from [2p/2, p/2) to [2p, p).)
In all models with measurement noise, we identify memory
resource with Fisher information, J(h) [34]. The reasons for this
choice are threefold [13]. First, regardless of the functional form of
the distribution of the internal representation of a stimulus (in our
formalism, of the scalar measurement), Fisher information
determines the best possible performance of any estimator through
the Crame´r-Rao bound [34], of which a version on a circular
space exists [35]. Second, when the measurement distribution is




, which is, up to an irrelevant proportionality constant, the
same relationship one would obtain by regarding resource as a
collection of discrete observations or samples [20,23]. Third, when
neural variability is Poisson-like, Fisher information is proportional
to the gain of the neural population [36–38], and therefore the
choice of Fisher information is consistent with regarding neural
activity as resource [13]. We will routinely refer to Fisher
information as precision. For the circular measurement distribu-
tion in Eq. (1), Fisher information is related to k through J~k I1 kð Þ
I0 kð Þ
[13,33], where I1(k) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind
of order 1.
Slots-plus-averaging model. The SA model [9] is an item-
limit model in which K discrete, indivisible chunks of resource are
allocated to items. When N.K, K randomly chosen items receive a
chunk and are encoded; the remaining N2K items are not
memorized. When N#K, chunks are distributed as evenly as
possible over all items. For example, if K= 4 and N = 3, two items
receive one chunk and one receives two. Resource per item, J, is
proportional to the number of chunks allocated to it, denoted S:
J = SJs, where Js is the Fisher information corresponding to one
chunk.
Slots-plus-resources model. The slots-plus-resources (SR)
model [9] is identical to the SA model, except that resource does
not come in discrete chunks but is a continuous quantity. When
N#K, all items are encoded with precision J = J1/N, where J1 is
the Fisher information for a single item. When N.K, K randomly
chosen items are encoded with precision J = J1/K and the
remaining N2K items are not memorized. Related but less
quantitative ideas have been proposed by Alvarez and Cavanagh
[14] and by Awh and colleagues [7,18].
Equal-precision model. According to the equal-precision
(EP) model [10–11,20,23], precision is a continuous quantity that
is equally divided over all items. Versions of this model have been
tested before on change detection data [8,10,39]. If the total
amount of memory precision were fixed across trials, we would
expect an inverse proportionality between J and set size.
However, there is no strong justification for this assumption, we
allow for a more flexible relationship by using a power-law
function, J = J1N
a.
Variable-precision model. In the variable-precision (VP)
model [13], encoding precision is variable across items and trials,
and average encoding precision depends on set size. We model
variability in precision by drawing J from a gamma distribution
with mean J and scale parameter t (Fig. 1b). The gamma
distribution is a flexible, two-parameter family of distributions on
the positive real line. The process by which a measurement x is
generated in the VP model is thus doubly stochastic: x is drawn
randomly from a Von Mises distribution with a given precision,
while precision itself is stochastic. Analogous to J in the EP model,




Working memory is a fundamental aspect of human
cognition. It allows us to remember bits of information
over short periods of time and make split-second decisions
about what to do next. Working memory is often tested
using a change detection task: subjects report whether a
change occurred between two subsequent visual images
that both contain multiple objects (items). The more items
are present in the images, the worse they do. The precise
origin of this phenomenon is not agreed on. The classic
theory asserts that working memory consists of a small
number of slots, each of which can store one item; when
there are more items than slots, the extra items are
discarded. A modern model postulates that working
memory is fundamentally limited in the quality rather
than the quantity of memories. In a metaphor: instead of
watering only a few plants in our garden, we water all of
them, but the more plants we have, the less water each
will receive on average. We show that this new model does
much better in accounting for human change detection
responses. This has consequences for the entire field of
working memory research.
No Item Limit in Change Detection
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Bayesian inference. In the models with noise (SA, SR, EP,
VP), the observer decides whether or not a change occurred (denoted
by C= 1 and C= 0) based on the noisy measurements in both displays
(Fig. 1c). We use xi and yi to denote the noisy measurements at the i
th
location in the first and second displays, and kx,i and ky,i are their
respective concentration parameters (see Eq. (1)). Due to the noise,
the measurements of any one item will always differ between displays,
even if the underlying stimulus value remains unchanged. Thus, also
on no-change trials, the observer is confronted with two non-identical
sets of measurements, making the inference problem difficult. While
the noise precludes perfect performance, the observer still has a best
possible strategy available, namely Bayesian MAP estimation. This
strategy consists of computing, on each trial, the probability of a
change based on the measurements, p(C= 1|x,y), where x and y are
the vectors of measurements {xi} and {yi}, respectively. The observer





Making use of the statistical structure of the task (Fig. S1), the














y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q : ð2Þ
(see Text S1 and [40]). Here, pchange is the prior probability that a
change occurred. This decision rule automatically models errors
arising in the comparison operation [1,18,29–30]: the difference
yi2xi is noisy, so that even when a change is absent, it might by
chance be large, and even when a change is present, it might by
chance be small.
In an earlier paper [40], we examined suboptimal alternative
decision rules. A plausible one would be a ‘‘threshold’’ rule,
according to which the observer compares the largest difference
between measurements at the same location in the two displays to
a fixed criterion. If the difference exceeds the criterion, the
observer reports that a change occurred. We proposed this
‘‘maximum-absolute-difference’’ rule in our earlier continuous-
resource treatment of change detection [10], but a comparison
against the optimal rule showed it to be inadequate [40].
Another suboptimal strategy that deserves attention is proba-
bility matching or sampling [41–42]. Under this strategy, the
observer computes the Bayesian posterior p(C= 1|x,y), but instead
of reporting a change (C^~1) when this probability exceeds 0.5,





p C~0Dx,yð Þkzp C~1Dx,yð Þk : ð3Þ
When k= 0, probability matching amounts to random guessing;
when kR‘, it reduces to MAP estimation. Thus, probability
matching consists of a family of stochastic decision rules
interpolating between MAP estimation and guessing. Probability
Figure 1. Models of change detection. Infinite-precision item limit (IP), slots plus averaging (SA), slots plus resources (SR), equal precision (EP),
and variable precision (VP). The first three are item-limit models, the last two continuous-resource models. (a) Illustration of resource allocation in the
models at set sizes 2 and 5, with a capacity of 3 slots/chunks for IP, SA, and SR. The VP model is distinct from the other models in that the amount of
resource varies on a continuum without a hard upper bound. (b) Probability density functions over encoding precision in the VP model, for four set
sizes. Parameters were taken from the best fit to the data of one human subject. Mean precision, indicated by a dashed line, is inversely proportional
to set size. In the EP model, these distributions would be infinitely sharp (delta functions). (c) Decision process during change detection for each of
the five models.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.g001
No Item Limit in Change Detection
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matching turns out to be very similar to a modification of MAP
estimation we considered in [40], namely adding zero-mean
Gaussian noise to the logarithm of the decision variable in Eq. (2).













which is the logistic function with argument log d. On the other
hand, adding zero-mean Gaussian noise g with standard deviation
sg to log d gives
p C^~1Dx,y
 




where W is the cumulative of the standard normal distribution. It is
easy to verify that the logistic function and the cumulative normal
distribution are close approximations of each other (with a one-to-
one relation between k and sg), showing that both forms of
suboptimality are very similar. Since an equal-precision model
augmented with Gaussian decision noise far underperformed the
variable-precision model [40], human data are unlikely to be
explained by such decision noise (or equivalently by probability
matching) in the absence of variable precision in the encoding
stage. It is, however, possible that decision noise is present in
addition to variability in encoding precision, but this would not
invalidate our conclusions. Therefore, in the present paper, we will
only examine the optimal Bayesian decision rule.
Free parameters. The IP, SA, SR, and EP models each
have 3 free parameters, and the VP model has 4.
Experiment: orientation change detection
We conducted an orientation change detection task in which we
manipulated both set size and change magnitude (Fig. 2a).
Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. [10,15,17]), we found that
the ability of observers to detect a change decreased with set size,
with hit rate H monotonically decreasing and false-alarm rate F
monotonically increasing (Fig. 2b). Effects of set size were
significant (repeated-measures ANOVA; hit rate: F(3,27) = 52.8,
p,0.001; false alarm rate: F(3,27) = 82.0, p,0.001). The increase
in F is inconsistent with the IP model, as this model would predict
no dependence.
For a more detailed representation of the data, we binned
magnitude of change on change trials into 10 bins (Fig. 2c). All no-
change trials had magnitude 0 and sat in a separate bin. These
psychometric curves clearly show that the probability of reporting
a change increases with change magnitude at every set size
(p,0.001). From Fig. 2c we could, in principle, compute a naı¨ve
estimate of memory capacity using the well-known formula from
the IP model, K=N(H2F)/(12F) [16]. However, since H depends
on the magnitude of change, the estimated K would depend on the
magnitude of change as well, contradicting the basic premise of a
fixed capacity. For example, at set size 6, for change magnitudes
between 0u and 9u, Cowan’s formula would estimate K at exactly
zero (no items retained at all), while for magnitudes between 81u
and 90u, it would estimate K at 3.8, with a nearly linear increase in
between. This serves as a first indication that the IP model in
general and this formula in particular are wrong.
Model fits. We fitted all models using maximum-likelihood
estimation, for each subject separately (see Text S1). Mean and
standard error of all parameters of all models are shown in Table 1.
The values of capacity K in the IP, SA, and SR models were
3.1060.28, 4.3060.47, and 4.3060.42, respectively (mean and
s.e.m.), in line with earlier studies [7–9,15–18]. Using the
maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters, we obtained
hit rates, false-alarm rates, and psychometric curves for each
model and each subject (Fig. 3).
Hit and false-alarm rates were best described by the VP model,
per root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the subject means (0.040),
followed by the SA and SR models (both 0.046), the equal-
precision (EP) model (0.059), and the IP model (0.070). The same
order was found for the psychometric curves (RMSE: 0.10 for VP,
0.11 for SA, 0.12 for SR, 0.13 for EP, and 0.21 for IP). The IP
model predicts that performance is independent of magnitude of
change and is therefore easy to rule out.
Bayesian model comparison. The RMS errors reported so
far are rather arbitrary descriptive statistics. To compare the
models in a more principled (though less visualizable) fashion, we
performed Bayesian model comparison, also called Bayes factors
[43–44] (see Text S1). This method returns the likelihood of each
model given the data and has three desirable properties: it uses all
data instead of only a subset (like cross-validation would) or
Figure 2. Orientation change detection. (a) Observers reported whether one of the orientations changed between the first and second displays.
(b) Hit and false-alarm rates as a function of set size. (c) Psychometric curves, showing the proportion of ‘‘change’’ reports as a function of the
magnitude of change, for each set size (mean6 s.e.m across subjects). Magnitude of change was binned into 9u bins. The first point on each curve (at
0u) contains all trials in which no change occurred, and thus represents the false-alarm rate. Using the standard formula for K would return different
estimates for different change magnitudes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.g002
No Item Limit in Change Detection
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summary; it does not solely rely on point estimates of the
parameters but integrates over parameter space, thereby account-
ing for the model’s robustness against variations in the parameters;
it automatically incorporates a correction for the number of free
parameters. We found that the log likelihood of the VP model
exceeds that of the IP, SA, SR, and EP models by 97611,
7.263.5, 7.463.7, and 1963, respectively (Fig. 4). This constitutes
strong evidence in favor of the VP model, for example according
to Jeffreys’ scale [45]. Based on our data, we can convincingly rule
out the three item-limit models (IP, SA, and SR) as well as the
equal-precision (EP) model, as descriptions of human change
detection behavior.
Apparent guessing as an epiphenomenon. In the delayed-
estimation paradigm of working memory [10], data consist of
subject’s estimates of a memorized stimulus on a continuous space.
Zhang and Luck [9] analyzed the histograms of estimation errors
in this task by fitting a mixture of a uniform distribution (allegedly
representing guesses) and a Von Mises distribution (allegedly
representing true estimates of the target stimulus). They suggested
that the mixture proportion of the uniform distribution represents
the rate at which subjects guess randomly, and interpreted its
increase with set size as evidence for a fixed limit on the number of
remembered items. However, Van den Berg et al. [13] later
showed that the variable-precision model reproduces the increase
of the mixture proportion of the uniform distribution with set size
well, even though the model does not contain any pure guessing.
They suggested that the guesses reported in the mixture analysis
were merely ‘‘apparent guesses’’.
We perform an analogous analysis for change detection here.
We fitted, at each set size separately, a model in which subjects
guess on a certain proportion of trials, and on other trials,
respond like an EP observer. Free parameters, at each set size
separately, are the guessing parameter, which we call apparent
guessing rate (AGR), and the precision parameter of the EP
observer. We found that AGR was significantly different from
zero at every set size (t(9).4.5, p,0.001) and increased with set
size (Fig. 5; repeated-measures ANOVA, main effect of set size:
F(3,27) = 21.1, p,0.001), reaching as much as 0.6060.06 at set
size 8.
We then examined how well each of our five models can
reproduce the increase of AGR. To do so, we computed AGR
from synthetic data generated using each model, using maximum-
likelihood estimates of the parameters as obtained from the
subjects’ data. We found that the VP model – which does not
Figure 3. Comparing models on summary statistics. (a) Model fits to the hit and false-alarm rates. (b) Model fits to the psychometric curves.
Shaded areas represent 61 s.e.m. in the model. For the IL model, a change of magnitude 0 has a separate proportion reports ‘‘change’’, equal to the
false-alarm rate shown in (a). In each plot, the root mean square error between the means of data and model is given.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.g003
Table 1. Fitted parameter ranges and estimates.
Experiment 1
estimates Tested range
Model Parameter Mean s.e.m. Min Max
IP K 3.10 0.28 1 8
e 0.220 0.021 0 1
G 0.247 0.016 0 0.5
SA Js 3.94 0.58 1 40
K 4.30 0.47 1 8
pchange 0.584 0.020 0.2 0.8
SR J1 14.2 1.7 1 60
K 4.30 0.42 1 8
pchange 0.574 0.019 0.2 0.8
EP J1 20.3 3.6 1 60
a 21.28 0.11 22 0
pchange 0.492 0.007 0.2 0.8
VP J1 53.1 6.1 5 300
t 31.2 8.9 5 300
a 20.88 0.08 22 0
pchange 0.532 0.005 0.2 0.8
Mean and standard error of the maximum-likelihood estimates and tested
ranges of model parameters for Experiment 1 (orientation change detection).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.t001
No Item Limit in Change Detection
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contain any actual guessing – reproduces the apparent guessing
rate better than the other models (Fig. 5; RMSE = 0.20 for VP).
This means that the apparent presence of guessing does not imply
that visual working memory is item-limited.
How the VP model can reproduce apparent guessing can be
understood as follows. In the VP model, the distribution of
precision is typically broad and includes a lot of small values,
especially at larger set sizes (Fig. 1b). The EP model augmented
with set size-dependent guessing would approximate this broad
distribution by one consisting of two spikes of probability, one at a
nonzero, fixed precision and one at zero precision. To mimic the
VP precision distribution, the weight of the spike at zero must
increase with set size, leading to an increase of AGR with set size.
In sum, variability in precision produces apparent guessing as an
epiphenomenon, a finding that is consistent with our results in the
delayed-estimation task [13].
Generalization. To assess the generality of our results, we
repeated the orientation change detection experiment with color
stimuli and found consistent results (see Figs. S2, S3, S4, S5 and
Text S1). Specifically, in Bayesian model comparison, the VP
model outperforms all other models by log likelihood differences of
at least 48.468.2, which constitutes further evidence against an
item limit.
Discussion
Implications for working memory
Five models of visual working memory limitations have been
proposed in the literature. Here, we tested all five using a change
detection paradigm. Although change detection has been inves-
tigated extensively, several of the models had never been applied
to this task and no previous study had compared all models.
Compared to previous studies, our use of a continuous stimulus
variable and changes drawn from a wide range of magnitudes
enhanced our ability to tell apart the model predictions. Our
results suggest that working memory resource is continuous and
variable and do not support the notion of an item limit.
The variable-precision model of change detection connects a
continuous-resource encoding model of working memory [13]
with a Bayesian model for decision-making in change detection
[33]. This improves on two related change detection studies that
advocated for continuous resources. Wilken and Ma [10]
introduced the concept of continuous resources, but only
compared an EP model with a suboptimal decision rule to the
IP model. Although the EP model won in this comparison, the
more recent item-limit models (SA and SR) had not yet been
proposed at that time. Our present results show that the SA and
SR models are improvements over both the EP and IP models, but
lose to the VP model. In a more recent study, we compared
different variants of the Bayesian model of the decision process
and found that the optimal decision rule outperformed suboptimal
ones [33], but we did not vary set size or compare different models
of working memory. Other tasks, such as change localization [13],
visual search [21,23], and multiple-object tracking [19,46], can
also be conceptualized using a resource-limited front end
conjoined with a Bayesian-observer back end. Whether such a
conceptualization will survive a deeper understanding of resource
limitations remains to be seen.
It is instructive to consider each model in terms of the distribution
over precision that it postulates for a given set size. In the IP model,
this distribution has mass at infinity and, depending on set size, also
at zero. In the SA and SR models, probability mass resides,
depending on set size, at one or two nonzero values, or at zero and
one nonzero value. The EP model has probability mass only at one
nonzero value. The VP model is the only model considered that
assigns probability to a broad, continuous range of precision values.
Roughly speaking, the more values of precision a model allows, the
better it seems to fit. Although we assumed in the VP model that
precision follows a gamma distribution, it is possible that a different
continuous distribution can describe variability in precision better.
However, the amount of data needed to distinguish different
Figure 4. Bayesian model comparison. Model log likelihood of
each model minus that of the VP model (mean 6 s.e.m.). A value of 2x
means that the data are ex times more probable under the VP model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.g004
Figure 5. Apparent guessing analysis. Apparent guessing rate as a function of set size as obtained from subject data (circles and error bars) and
synthetic data generated by each model (shaded areas). Even though the VP model does not contain any ‘‘true’’ guesses, it still accounts best for the
apparent guessing rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002927.g005
No Item Limit in Change Detection
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continuous precision distributions using psychophysics only might
be prohibitive.
Work by Rouder et al. used a change detection task to compare
a continuous-resource model based on signal detection theory to a
variant of the IP model [8]. Manipulating bias, they measured
receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs). The IP variant predict-
ed straight-line ROCs, whereas the continuous-resource model
predicted regular ROCs (i.e., passing through the origin).
Unfortunately, each of the ROCs they measured contained only
three points, and therefore the models were very difficult to
distinguish. We ourselves, in an earlier study, had collected five-
point ROCs using confidence ratings, allowing for an easier
distinction between different ROC types; there, we found that the
ROCs were regular [10], in support of a continuous-resource
model. A difference between the Rouder study and our current
study is that Rouder et al. used ten distinct colors instead of a one-
dimensional continuum; this again has the disadvantage of missing
the stimulus regime in which the signal-to-noise ratio is low.
Moreover, the decision process in their continuous-resource model
was not optimal; an optimal observer would utilize knowledge of
the distribution of the stimuli and change magnitudes used in the
experiment. It is likely that the optimal decision rule would have
described human behavior in Rouder et al.’s experiment better
than an ad-hoc suboptimal rule [33]. Finally, Rouder et al. did not
consider variability in precision. In short, our current study does
not contradict the results of Rouder et al., but offers a more
plausible continuous-resource model and tests all models over a
broader range of experimental conditions.
The notion of an item limit on the one hand and continuous or
variable resources on the other hand are not mutually exclusive. In
the SR model, for example, a continuous resource is split among a
limited number of items. Although this model was not the best in
the present study, many other ‘‘hybrid’’ models can be conceived –
such as a VP model augmented with an item limit, or an IP or SA
model with variable capacity [47–48] – and testing them is an
important direction for future work. Our results, however,
establish the VP model as the standard against which any new
model of change detection should be compared.
Neural implications
The neural basis of working memory limitations is unknown. In
the variable-precision model, encoding precision is the central
concept, raising the question which neural quantity corresponds to
encoding precision. We hypothesize that precision relates to neural
gain, according to the reasoning laid out in previous work
[13,19,33]. To summarize, gain translates directly to precision in
sensory population codes [49], increased gain correlates with
increased attention [50], and high gain is energetically costly [51],
potentially bringing encoding precision down as set size increases.
The variable-precision model predicts that the gain associated with
the encoding of each item exhibits large fluctuations across items
and trials. There is initial neurophysiological support for this
prediction [52–53]. Furthermore, if gain is variable, then spiking
activity originates from a doubly stochastic process: spiking is
stochastic for a given of value of gain, while gain is stochastic itself.
Recent evidence points in this direction [54–55], although formal
model comparison remains to be done. The variable-precision
model also predicts that gain on average decreases with increasing
set size. We proposed in earlier work that this could be realized
mechanistically by divisive normalization [19]. Divisive normal-
ization could act on the gains of the input populations by
approximately dividing each gain by the sum of the gains across all
locations raised to some power [56]. When set size is larger, the
division would be by a larger number, resulting in a
post-normalization gain that decreases with set size. A spiking
neural network implementation of aspects of continuous-resource
models was proposed recently [57]. Taken together, the variable-
precision model has plausible neural underpinnings.
Our results have far-reaching implications for neural studies of
working memory limitations. Throughout the field, taking a fixed
item limit for granted has been the norm, and many studies have
focused on finding its neural correlates [12,58]. Even if we restrict
ourselves to change detection only, a fixed item limit has been
assumed by studies that used fMRI [59–65], EEG [66–72], MEG
[67,72–73], voxel-based morphometry [74], TMS [68,75], lesion
patients [76], and computational models [77–78]. Our present
results undermine the theoretical basis of all these studies. Neural
studies that questioned the item-limit model or attempted to
correlate neural measures with parameters in a continuous-
resource model have been rare [27,57]. Perhaps, this is because
no continuous-resource model has so far been perceived as
compelling. The variable-precision model remedies this situation
and might inspire a new generation of neural studies.
Materials and Methods
Stimuli
Stimuli were displayed on a 210 LCD monitor at a viewing
distance of approximately 60 cm. Stimuli were oriented ellipses
with minor and major axes of 0.41 and 0.94 degrees of visual angle
(deg), respectively. On each trial, ellipse centers were chosen by
placing one at a random location on an imaginary circle of radius
7 deg around the screen center, placing the next one 45u
counterclockwise from the first along the circle, etc., until all
ellipses had been placed. Set size was 2, 4, 6, or 8. Each ellipse
position was jittered by a random amount between 20.3 and 0.3
deg in both x- and y-directions to reduce the probability of
orientation alignments between items. Stimulus and background
luminances were 95.7 and 33.1 cd/m2, respectively.
Participants
Ten observers participated (4 female, 6 male; 3 authors). All
were between 20 and 35 years old, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and gave informed consent.
Procedure
On each trial, the first stimulus display was presented for
117 ms, followed by a delay period (1000 ms) and a second
stimulus display (117 ms). In the first display, set size was chosen
randomly and the orientation of each item was drawn indepen-
dently from a uniform distribution over all possible orientations.
The second display was identical to the first, except that there was
a 50% chance that one of the ellipses had changed its orientation
by an angle drawn from a uniform distribution over all possible
orientations. The ellipse centers in the second screen were jittered
independently from those in the first. Following the second display,
the observer pressed a key to indicate whether there was a change
between the first and second displays. A correct response caused
the fixation cross to turn green and an incorrect response caused it
to turn red. During the instruction phase, observers were informed
in lay terms about the distributions from which the stimuli were
drawn (e.g., ‘‘The change is equally likely to be of any
magnitude.’’). Each observer completed three sessions of 600
trials each, with each session on a separate day, for a total of 1800
trials. There were timed breaks after every 100 trials. During each
break, the screen displayed the observer’s cumulative percentage
correct.
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Model fitting and model comparison
Methods for model fitting and model comparison are described
in the Text S1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Generative model. The generative model shows
the relevant variables in the change detection task and the
statistical dependencies between them. C: change occurrence (0 or
1); D: magnitude of change; D: vector of change magnitudes at all
locations; h and Q: vectors of stimuli in the first and second
displays, respectively; x and y: vectors of measurements in the first
and second displays, respectively.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Color change detection. Observers reported
whether one of the colors changed between the first and second
displays.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Color change detection: summary statistics
and model fits. (a) Model fits to the hit and false-alarm rates. (b)
Model fits to the psychometric curves. Shaded areas represent 61
s.e.m. in the model. For the IL model, a change of magnitude 0
has a separate proportion reports ‘‘change’’, equal to the false-
alarm rate shown in (a). In each plot, the root mean square error
between the means of data and model is given.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Color change detection: Bayesian model
comparison. Model log likelihood of each model minus that of
the VP model (mean 6 s.e.m.). A value of 2x means that the data
are ex times more probable under the VP model.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Color change detection: apparent guessing
analysis. Apparent guessing rate as a function of set size as
obtained from subject data (circles and error bars) and synthetic
data generated by each model (shaded areas). Even though the VP
model does not contain any ‘‘true’’ guesses, it still accounts best for
the apparent guessing rate.
(TIF)
Table S1 Mean and standard error of the maximum-
likelihood estimates and tested ranges of model param-
eters for Experiment 2 (color change detection).
(DOCX)
Text S1 Supporting text. Detailed derivation of Bayesian
decision rule and explanation of model fitting and comparison




Developed the theory: SK RvdB WJM. Conceived and designed the
experiments: SK RvdB WJM. Performed the experiments: SK. Analyzed
the data: SK RvdB WJM. Wrote the paper: SK RvdB WJM.
References
1. Rensink RA (2002) Change detection. Annu Rev Psychol 53: 245–277.
2. Pashler H (1988) Familiarity and visual change detection. Percept Psychophys
44: 369–378.
3. Phillips WA (1974) On the distinction between sensory storage and short-term
visual memory. Percept Psychophys 16: 283–290.
4. Irwin DE (1991) Information integration across saccadic eye movements. Cogn
Psychology 23: 420–456.
5. Henderson JM (2008) Eye movements and visual memory. Visual Memory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87–121.
6. Brouwer A-M, Knill DC (2007) The role of memory in visually guided reaching.
Journal of Vision 7: 1–12.
7. Anderson DE, Vogel EK, Awh E (2011) Precision in visual working memory
reaches a stable plateau when individual item limits are exceeded. J Neurosci 31:
1128–1138.
8. Rouder J, Morey R, Cowan N, Morey C, Pratte M (2008) An assessment of
fixed-capacity models of visual working memory. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 105:
5975–5979.
9. Zhang W, Luck SJ (2008) Discrete fixed-resolution representations in visual
working memory. Nature 453: 233–235.
10. Wilken P, Ma WJ (2004) A detection theory account of change detection.
J Vision 4: 1120–1135.
11. Bays PM, Husain M (2008) Dynamic shifts of limited working memory resources
in human vision. Science 321: 851–854.
12. Fukuda K, Awh E, Vogel EK (2010) Discrete capacity limits in visual working
memory. Curr Opin Neurobiol 20: 177–182.
13. Van den Berg R, Shin H, Chou W-C, George R, Ma WJ (2012) Variability in
encoding precision accounts for visual short-term memory limitations. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 109: 8780–8785.
14. Alvarez GA, Cavanagh P (2004) The capacity of visual short-term memory is set
both by visual information load and by number of objects. Psych Science 15:
106–111.
15. Luck SJ, Vogel EK (1997) The capacity of visual working memory for features
and conjunctions. Nature 390: 279–281.
16. Cowan N (2001) The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a
reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behav Brain Sci 24: 87–114.
17. Eng HY, Chen D, Jiang Y (2005) Visual working memory for simple and
complex visual stimuli. Psychon B Rev 12: 1127–1133.
18. Awh E, Barton B, Vogel EK (2007) Visual working memory represents a fixed
number of items regardless of complexity. Psych Science 18: 622–628.
19. Ma WJ, Huang W (2009) No capacity limit in attentional tracking: Evidence for
probabilistic inference under a resource constraint. J Vision 9: 3: 1–30.
20. Shaw ML (1980) Identifying attentional and decision-making components in
information processing. In: Nickerson RS, editor. Attention and Performance.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 277–296.
21. Mazyar H, Van den Berg R, Ma WJ (2012) Does precision decrease with set
size? J Vision 12: 10,11–16.
22. Bays PM, Catalao RFG, Husain M (2009) The precision of visual working
memory is set by allocation of a shared resource. J Vision 9: 1–11.
23. Palmer J (1990) Attentional limits on the perception and memory of visual
information. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 16: 332–350.
24. French RS (1953) The discrimination of dot patterns as a function of number
and average separation of dots. J Exp Psychol 46: 1–9.
25. Elmore LC, Ma WJ, Magnotti JF, Leising KJ, Passaro AD, et al. (2011) Visual
short-term memory compared in rhesus monkeys and humans. Curr Biol 21:
975–979.
26. Heyselaar E, Johnston K, Pare M (2011) A change detection approach to study
visual working memory of the macaque monkey. J Vision 11: 11:11–10.
27. Buschman TJ, Siegel M, Roy RE, Miller EK (2011) Neural substrates of
cognitive capacity limitations. Proc Natl Acad Sci 108: 11252–11255.
28. Lara AH, Wallis JD (2012) Capacity and precision in an animal model of short-
term memory. J Vision 12: 1–12.
29. Scott-Brown KC, Baker MR, Orbach HS (2000) Comparison blindness. Visual
Cognition 7: 253–267.
30. Simons DJ, Rensink RA (2005) Change blindness: past, present, and future.
Trends Cogn Sci 9: 16–20.
31. Peterson WW, Birdsall TG, Fox WC (1954) The theory of signal detectability.
Transactions IRE Profession Group on Information Theory, PGIT-4 : 171–212.
32. Knill DC, Richards W, eds. (1996) Perception as Bayesian Inference. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
33. Keshvari S, Van den Berg R, Ma WJ (2012) Probabilistic computation in human
perception under variability in encoding precision. PLoS ONE 7: e40216.
34. Cover TM, Thomas JA (1991) Elements of information theory. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
35. Mardia KV, Jupp PE (1999) Directional statistics: John Wiley and Sons. 350 p.
36. Seung H, Sompolinsky H (1993) Simple model for reading neuronal population
codes. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA 90: 10749–10753.
37. Paradiso M (1988) A theory of the use of visual orientation information which
exploits the columnar structure of striate cortex. Biological Cybernetics 58: 35–
49.
38. Ma WJ, Beck JM, Latham PE, Pouget A (2006) Bayesian inference with
probabilistic population codes. Nat Neurosci 9: 1432–1438.
39. Cowan N, Rouder JN (2009) Comment on ‘‘Dynamic shifts of limited working
memory resources in human vision’’. Science 323: 877.
40. Keshvari S, Van den Berg R, Ma WJ (2012) Probabilistic computation in human
perception under variability in encoding precision. PLoS One 7: e40216.
41. Vulkan N (2000) An economist’s perspective on probability matching.
J Economic Surveys 14: 101–118.
No Item Limit in Change Detection
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 February 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e1002927
42. Mamassian P, Landy MS (1998) Observer biases in the 3D interpretation of line
drawings. Vision Research 38: 2817–2832.
43. Wasserman L (2000) Bayesian model selection and model averaging. J Math
Psych 44: 92–107.
44. Kass RE, Raftery AE (1995) Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 90: 773–795.
45. Jeffreys H (1961) The theory of probability. Oxford University Press. 470 p.
46. Vul E, Frank M, Alvarez GA, Tenenbaum JB (2009) Explaining human multiple
object tracking as resource-constrained approximate inference in a dynamic
probabilistic model. Neural Information Processing Systems 22: 1955.
47. Dyrholm M, Kyllingsbaek S, Espeseth T, Bundesen C (2011) Generalizing
parametric models by introducing trial-by-trial parameter variability: The case
of TVA. J Math Psych 55: 416–429.
48. Sims CR, Jacobs RA, Knill DC (2012) An ideal-observer analysis of visual
working memory. Psychol Rev 119: 807–30.
49. Pouget A, Dayan P, Zemel RS (2003) Inference and computation with
population codes. Annual Review of Neuroscience 26: 381–410.
50. Desimone R, Duncan J (1995) Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention.
Annual Review of Neuroscience 18: 193–222.
51. Lennie P (2003) The cost of cortical computation. Curr Biol 13: 493–497.
52. Cohen MR, Maunsell JHR (2010) A neuronal population measure of attention
predicts behavioral performance on individual trials. J Neurosci 30: 15241–
15253.
53. Nienborg H, Cumming BG (2009) Decision-related activity in sensory neurons
reflects more than a neuron’s causal effect. Nature 459: 89–92.
54. Churchland AK, Kiani R, Chaudhuri R, Wang X-J, Pouget A, et al. (2011)
Variance as a signature of neural computations during decision-making. Neuron
69: 818–831.
55. Churchland MM, Yu BM, Cunningham JP, Sugrue LP, Cohen MR, et al.
(2010) Stimulus onset quenches neural variability: a widespread cortical
phenomenon. Nat Neurosci 13: 369–378.
56. Reynolds JH, Heeger DJ (2009) The normalization model of attention. Neuron
61: 168–185.
57. Wei Z, Wang XJ, Wang DH (2012) From distributed resources to limited slots in
multiple-item working memory: a spiking network model with normalization.
J Neurosci 32: 11228–11240.
58. Marois R, Ivanoff J (2005) Capacity limits of information processing in the brain.
Trends Cogn Sci 9: 296–305.
59. Xu Y, Chun MM (2006) Dissociable neural mechanisms supporting visual short-
term memory for objects. Nature 440: 91–95.
60. Todd JJ, Marois R (2004) Capacity limit of visual short-term memory in human
posterior parietal cortex. Nature 428: 751–754.
61. Mitchell (2008) Flexible, capacity-limited activity of posterior parietal cortex in
perceptual as well as visual short-term memory tasks. Cereb Cortex 18: 1788–
1798.
62. Konstantinou N, Bahrami B, Rees G, Lavie N (2012) Visual short-term memory
load reduces retinotopic cortex response to contrast. J Cogn Neurosci 24: 2199–
210.
63. Xu Y (2010) The neural fate of task-irrelevant features in object-based
processing. J Neurosci 30: 14020–14028.
64. Schneider-Garces N, Gordon B, Brumback-Peltz C, Shin E, Lee Y, et al. (2010)
Span, CRUNCH, and beyond: working memory capacity and the aging brain.
J Cogn Neurosci 2010: 4.
65. Harrison A, Jolicoeur P, Marois R (2010) ‘‘What’’ and ‘‘where’’ in the
intraparietal sulcus: an fMRI study of object identity and location in visual short-
term memory. Cereb Cortex 20: 2478–2485.
66. Vogel EK, Machizawa MG (2004) Neural activity predicts individual differences
in visual working memory capacity. Nature 428: 748–751.
67. Palva J, Monto S, Kulashekhar SP, S (2010) Neuronal synchrony reveals
working memory networks and predicts individual memory capacity. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 107: 7580–7585.
68. Sauseng P, Klimesch W, Heise KF, Glennon M, Gerloff C, et al. (2009) Brain
oscillatory substrates of visual short-term memory capacity. Curr Biol 19: 1846–
1852.
69. Luria R, Sessa P, Gotler A, Jolicoeur P, Dell’acqua R (2009) Visual short-term
memory capacity for simple and complex objects. J Cogn Neurosci 22: 496–512.
70. Grimault S, Robitaille N, Grova C, Lina J-M, Dubarry A-S, et al. (2009)
Oscillatory activity in parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during retention
in visual short-term memory: additive effects of spatial attention and memory
load. Human Brain Mapping 30: 3378–3392.
71. Emrich S, Al-Aidroos N, Pratt J, Ferber S (2009) Visual search elicits the
electrophysiological marker of visual working memory. PLoS ONE 4: e8042.
72. Palva S, Kulashekhar S, Ha¨ma¨la¨inen M, Palva J (2011) Localization of cortical
phase and amplitude dynamics during visual working memory encoding and
retention. J Neurosci 31: 5013–5025.
73. Roux F, Wibral M, Mohr H, Singer W, Uhlhaas P (2012) Gamma-band activity
in human prefrontal cortex codes for the number of relevant items maintained in
working memory. J Neurosci 32: 12411–12420.
74. Sligte I, Scholte H, Lamme V (2009) Grey matter volume explains individual
differences in visual short-term memory capacity. J Vision 9: 598.
75. Tseng P, Hsu T-Y, Chang C-F, Tzeng O, Hung D, et al. (2012) Unleashing
potential: transcranial direct current stimulation over the right posterior parietal
cortex improves change detection in low-performing individuals. J Neurosci 32:
10554–10561.
76. Jeneson A, Wixted J, Hopkins R, Squire L (2012) Visual working memory
capacity and the medial temporal lobe. J Cogn Neurosci 32: 3584–3589.
77. Lisman JE, Idiart MA (1995) Storage of 7+/22 short-term memories in
oscillatory subcycles. Science 267: 1512–1515.
78. Raffone A, Wolters G (2001) A cortical mechanism for binding in visual working
memory. J Cogn Neurosci 13: 766–785.
No Item Limit in Change Detection
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 9 February 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e1002927
